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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
VINCENT L. BELGARD, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 15743 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Automobile Homicide, 
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 
(1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, VINCENT L. BELGARD, was charged by Information 
with the offense of Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as 
amended) (T.6, Vol. II). On November 17, 1977, the appellant 
was convicted by a jury of the offense charged in the 
Information. On March 17, 1978, the appellant was sentenced 
by the above entitled court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge 
presiding, to zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. 
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Appellant has previously filed a brief in this matter without 
reply from respondent and offers this Supplemental Brief 
on Appeal raising an additional and it is urged dispositive 
issue. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, VINCENT L, BELGARD, seeks reversal of the 
judgment of guilt entered against him and a remand of the 
instant case to the trial court for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant submits the Statement of the Facts offered in 1 




THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THAT AN ELEMENT 
OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE WAS NEGLIGENCE AND THE COURT 
PROPERLY SHOULD HA VE INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT CRIMINAL 
NEGLIGENCE IS REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A CHARGE OF 
AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE. 
Appellant was charged in one count of the Information with 
Automobile Homicide. Appellant contends that the court 
erroneously instructed the jury in the elements of automobile 
homicide because the court instructed the jury that simple 
negligence was all that the State needed to prove and appellant 
contends that criminal negligence is a necessary element of 
-2-
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any homicide offense in the State of Utah. 
The recent decision of this Court in State of Utah v. 
Johnny M. Chavez, Utah P. 2d __ (no. 16132 Filed 12-31- 79) 
is dispositive of this issue and mandates reversal of appellant's 
conviction of Automobile Homicide and remand to the district 
court for new trial. 
In Chavez this court reversed its previous rulings in 
State v. Durrant, Utah, 561 P.2d 1056 (1977), State v. Anderson, 
Utah, 561 P.2d 1061 (1977) and State v. Wade, Utah 472 P.2d 
398 (1977) and held that an instruction in an Automobile 
Homicide prosecution which defined "negligence" in simple 
negligence tenns was error mandating reversal and new trial. 
In the case at bar the trial Court in Instruction No. 
25 (R. 72) defined automobile homicide as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-207 (1953 as amended) and said that it was sufficient 
if a person caused the death of another by operating a vehicle 
in a negligent manner. The Court in Instruction No. 26 
(R.73) also used in paragraph 3 the term simple negligence 
as the element. Negligence was defined by the Court in 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instruction No. 21 (R. ~) . 1 Appellant excepted to the giving 
of those instructions on the basis that criminal negligence 
was necessary. Appellant offered instructions which defined 
automobile homicide and required criminal negligence and set out· 
the elements of automobile homicide, one of those elements 
being criminal negligence rather than simple negligence. 
Appellant's proposed Instruction No. 7 (R.9.J). 2 
The Court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 22 that 
any speed in excess of the posted speed limit would be 
sufficient evidence to permit a finding of negligence (R. 69) _J ' 
1. Instruction no. 21: 
"Negligence is the failure to do 'Nhat a reasonable and prudent person 1 
would have done under the circunstances or doing 'Nhat such person under such 
circunstances ~d not have done. The fault may lie in acting or in 
comnitting to.act. 
2. Appellant's proposed Instruction on Criminal Negligence was taken fron 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (1953 as a!IEilded) and stated in its entirety. 
As used in these instructions negligence is defined with respect to 
circunstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his a:mduct men he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the cirCtlll'ltan~ 
exist or the result will occur. The risk nust be of such a nature and degree 
tJhat the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standari 
of care that an ordinary person .vould exercise in all the circUIBtances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
3. In its entirety this instruction stated: 
It is the duty of a driver to operate his autorrobile at a speed that~ 
safe, reasonable and prudent under the circurrstances, with due regard to the 
surface and width of the roadway, the traffic thereon, and any actua~ or tooeO: 
potential hazards then existing. Failure of the driver to operate ~s au :1 in accordance with the foregoing requirerrents of the law .vould constitute negW 
on his part . 50 mile 
The legal speed limit for the place in question in this case was endiilg 
per hour. This rreans only that in the absence of any special hazards t b 
to make such a speed limit unsafe, then the speed limit indicated should ~ 
regarded as reasonable and lawful under ordinary circurrstancei;; .. But H!fY 5 ce 
in excess of such indicated speed limit .vould constitute sufficient eviden 
to permit a finding of negligence. 
-4-
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And, in Instruction No. 23 (R. 70) the Court instructed the jury 
that failure of a driver to obey a traffic control device 
would constitute "negligence" (R . .Z.Q)~ 
Appellant Instruction No. 7 was not submitted to the jury 
even though as in Chavez it defined negligence in terms of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1953 as amended). 
Appellant's contention at the time of trial and now 
is that under our statutes no offense is a criminal offense unless 
a person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with 
criminal negligence or his act constitutes an offense involving 
strict liability. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101 (1953 as amended). 
Further, appellant was charged with a form of criminal 
homicide and our statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-201 (1953 as 
amended) provides that a person connnits criminal homicide 
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal 
negligence unlawfully causes the death of another. Criminal 
Homicide is defined as murder in the first and second degree, 
manslaughter, or negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
Appellant was fully aware that this argument was made and 
4. This instruction in its entirety stated: 
If you find that a driver of a vehicle failed to obey t:i:ie ~tructions 
of a traffic-control signal at an intersection where ~ traffic :-S. oontrolled 
by a traffic-control signal, such a finding would constitute suf~cient 
evidence to permit a finding of "negligent" as stated elsewhere in 
these instructions. 
A traffic-control signal includes any device, ~ether manually! 
electrically, or rrechanically operated by which traffic alternately directed 
to stop and to proceed. 
-5-
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rejected by this Court in three previous cases, St t a e v. Du~ 
561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1977), State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398 (Utah lln 
and State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977). Appellant 
contended however that the opinions in those cases are and were 
erroneous and the dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan 
in State v. Durant, supra was the correct law in the State of 
Utah, and should have been adopted by this Court and the above 
three cited cases shoulJd be overruled based upon reasoning set 
forth by Justice Maughan. 
Appellant saw his argument adopted in Chavez and his 
case also demands reversal and remand for retrial in accordance 
with the Chavez opinion. 
The appellant, Belgard, was charged with events arising 
on July 28, 1977 (Brief of Appellant at 2). Johnny Chavez 
was charged with events arising on July 21, 1977 (Brief of 
Appellant State of Utah v. Johnny Chavez Case No. 16132 at 1). 
The appellant-Belgard was convicted after trial on November 17, 11 
and Johnny Chavez was convicted after trial on March 29, 1978. 
Under the facts of this case where appellant was found 
guilty of automobile homicide, it is apparent that the jury 
found appellant to be negligent in his driving pattern otherwise 
appellant could not have been found guilty. However, had the 
jury been properly instructed that he must have acted with 
criminal negligence, using the definition of criminal negligence 
the jury may not have found that the risk taken by appellant 
was of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it 
-6-
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(namely the red light) constituted a gross deviation frGm 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circtIDlstances as viewed from appellant's standpoint. 
The clear difference between negligence and criminal negligence 
could easily have made a vast difference in the outcome of this 
case. 
The statement of Justice Wilkins writing for the majority 
in Chavez applies equally to appellant-Belgard. 
We are therefore of the opinion that our previous 
cases holding that automobile homicide requires 
only proof of simple negligence under §76-5-207 are 
in error, and are overruled. And we hold that a 
conviction of automobile homicide requires an 
instruction on criminal negligence as that term 
is defined in §76-2-103(4), and a determination 
thereof by the jury. As the Court's Instruction 
18 defined simple negligence and not criminal 
negligence, defendant is entitled to a new trial. 
(State of Utah v. Johnny Chavez, Utah Supreme Court 
Case No. 16132 Advance Slip Opinion at 4.) 
For the above stated reason appellant requests reversal 
of his conviction for Automobile Homicide and remand to the 
Third Judicial District Court for new trial. 
~~ Respectfully submitted this~ day of February, 1980. 
DJ. YENGICH 
ell and Yengich 
Atto eys at Law 
44 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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